Promissory Estoppel & Promissory Restitution

Today we work the two doctrines that enforce promises bargain cannot reach. They run on different facts and in different directions in time. Promissory estoppel (R2d § 90) tracks what the promisee did after the promise; promissory restitution (R2d § 86) tracks what the promisor received before it. Both arrive at enforcement without consideration; neither does so freely.

Promissory estoppel

R2d § 90. A promise the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, and which does induce it, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement; the remedy may be limited as justice requires. Four elements: (1) a clear and definite promise, (2) reliance the promisor should foresee, (3) actual reliance to the promisee’s detriment, and (4) injustice avoidable only by enforcement. The injustice prong is where judgment enters: courts weigh the reasonableness and the definite, substantial character of the reliance. Reliance need not be of substantial character in charitable-subscription cases (R2d § 90(2)), but the casebook flags that some states, like Maryland in United Jewish Appeal, reject that special rule and demand proof of reliance even from charities. The Restatement is a comment on the law, not the law.

Promissory restitution

R2d § 86. A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice, unless the benefit was conferred as a gift or the value of the promise is disproportionate to the benefit. This is the material-benefit rule, the narrow exception to “past consideration is no consideration.” It reaches the case the parties would have bargained for had an emergency or accident not made bargaining impossible. The limits matter: a gift confers no recoverable benefit, and a wildly disproportionate promise is enforced only up to the benefit’s value.

Cases

Conrad v. Fields and Ricketts v. Scothorn anchor the § 90 track. In Conrad, repeated assurances to pay for law school induced the plaintiff to quit her job and enroll; the Minnesota court enforced the promise, finding reasonable reliance and injustice. In Ricketts, the grandfather’s note inducing Katie to quit work was enforced against his estate though the court found no consideration. Both show reliance supplying what bargain lacked.

Webb v. McGowin and Drake v. Bell anchor the § 86 track. Webb saved McGowin’s life, crippling himself; McGowin’s later promise of lifelong support was enforced because Webb conferred a material benefit, the case the parties would have bargained for had there been time. In Drake, a workman mistakenly repaired the wrong house; the owner, after seeing the value, promised to pay, and the promise was enforced because the benefit was real and not a gift.

Mills v. Wyman marks the boundary. A father promised to pay a stranger who had nursed his adult son; the court refused to enforce. The benefit ran to the son, not the father; moral obligation alone, untethered to a material benefit to the promisor, is not enough. Mills is the floor against which § 86 is measured.

What you should be able to do

Apply the four R2d § 90 elements to a quit-job reliance pattern and pinpoint the element doing the work. Apply R2d § 86 to a post-rescue or mistaken-benefit promise and test it against the gift and disproportionality limits. Distinguish the two doctrines by where in time the operative fact sits, and explain why Mills fails while Webb succeeds. Class 15 runs all three tracks, bargain, reliance, and benefit, side by side in the Module III capstone.