Consideration cont. + Promissory Estoppel setup

This is a bridge class. We push the bargain inquiry to its limit, where the promisee gives up nothing she did not already owe, and then open the gap that consideration cannot reach: the gratuitous promise that someone has relied on. Today closes consideration and previews promissory estoppel without finishing either.

The limits of bargain

R2d § 71. The bargain runs both directions. Hamer v. Sidway found consideration in the promisee’s surrender of a legal liberty; Pennsy Supply found it in the promisor’s escape from a disposal cost. In each, the inducement link was real: the thing given was sought in exchange. Today we test where that link fails.

R2d § 73, Pre-existing duty. A promise to perform a duty you already owe is not consideration. You surrender nothing. This is the classic trap: a transaction can look bargained for and still fail because one side gives up only what the law already required. R2d § 74 carries the same logic to settlements; forbearance on a claim known to be worthless is not consideration. Illusory promises fail for a related reason: a “promise” that reserves total discretion (“if I feel like it”) binds the promisor to nothing and so cannot be the price of anything.

The gap reliance fills

R2d § 90. A promise the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, and which does induce it, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement. Four elements do the work: (1) a clear and definite promise, (2) reliance the promisor should foresee, (3) actual reliance by the promisee, and (4) injustice avoidable only by enforcement. Strike any one and the doctrine fails. Where no bargain runs at all but reliance does, R2d § 90 enters where R2d § 71 cannot.

Cases

Conrad v. Fields previews the modern doctrine. Fields, a wealthy acquaintance, repeatedly assured Conrad he would pay for her law school; she quit her job and enrolled in reliance. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held the promise enforceable under promissory estoppel: a clear and definite promise, foreseeable and actual reliance (tuition and a forgone salary), and injustice that only enforcement could avoid. Reliance supplied what bargain did not.

Ricketts v. Scothorn is the historical anchor. A grandfather gave Katie a note for $2,000 and told her she need not work; she quit her bookkeeping job. The court found no consideration, the note was a promise of a future gift, but enforced it against the estate on an equitable-estoppel theory, because the grandfather intentionally induced her to change her position for the worse. The case shows reliance becoming a ground of enforcement before the Restatement gave it a section number. Note the inducement requirement: strip out the causal link between promise and reliance and the doctrine collapses.

What you should be able to do

Apply R2d § 73 to spot a pre-existing-duty problem and explain why an apparent bargain fails for want of a genuine detriment. Identify an illusory promise. State the four elements of R2d § 90 and map each to the facts of Conrad and Ricketts. Class 14 walks those four elements in full and adds R2d § 86, the second non-bargain route, where the promisor’s prior benefit, not the promisee’s reliance, supports the later promise.