Mills v. Wyman

20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · 1825

Rule

A moral obligation alone is not sufficient consideration to support a promise. A promise to pay for benefits already conferred to a third person (here, an adult son) is unenforceable for want of consideration.

Learning outcomes

By the end of working with this case, you can:

Facts

Levi Wyman, an adult son of Seth Wyman, fell sick on his return from a sea voyage and was taken in and cared for by Daniel Mills, a stranger, until Levi died. After his son’s death, Seth wrote to Mills promising to pay him for the expenses Mills had incurred. Seth later refused to pay, and Mills sued on the promise.

Holding

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the promise unenforceable. Whatever the father’s moral duty, the law required consideration, and a past act conferring no benefit on the promisor and unrequested at the time it was performed could not supply it.

Reasoning

Chief Justice Parker acknowledged the moral force of the father’s promise but insisted that the law of contract does not enforce promises merely because they are right. Consideration must be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee bargained for in the exchange. Past services rendered to a third party at no request of the promisor furnish neither. The court observed that to enforce all morally binding promises would erase the line between law and conscience.

Why it matters

Mills v. Wyman is the classical statement that past consideration is no consideration and that moral obligation, standing alone, will not bind. Together with Webb v. McGowin, it frames the chapter on promissory restitution: Mills shows the strict rule, Webb shows the material-benefit exception. The teaching pair is one of the oldest and tightest in the curriculum.

The trap

Collapsing Mills into Webb v. McGowin or Drake by reciting 'a benefit was conferred.' Two elements are missing: the benefit went to the son (the third party), not to the father (the promisor); and there was no antecedent legal duty the promise was settling.

The operational intuition the case is designed to break. Naming the trap is what the Socratic exchange is for.

Socratic ladder

The professor's scaffold for the in-class exchange. Each rung is a stage; the questions are scripted prompts, not the punchline.

Surfacing · 60 sec

Q. A stranger nurses your adult son back from a terminal illness at her own expense while you are far away. He dies. You write to her: 'I will pay your expenses.' Months later you change your mind. Should the law enforce the promise?

Look for: Most students say yes. The promise was deliberate, the benefit was real, refusal looks ugly. The intuition is moral; the legal answer rejects it.

Holding · 60 sec

Q. What did the Massachusetts court do with the father's promise?

Look for: Refused to enforce. Moral obligation alone is not consideration.

Reasoning · 120 sec

Q. The father got nothing. The son was an adult. The nursing was already complete when the promise was made. Why does that combination defeat enforcement?

Trap: Students collapse Mills into Webb or Drake by saying 'but a benefit was conferred.' Two things are missing: the benefit ran to the son, not the father; and the father had no antecedent legal duty to discharge.

Board: Past consideration = no consideration; moral obligation alone = no bind

Push back: Who received the nursing? The father or the son? Consideration cares about exchange between the promisor and the promisee. What is missing here?

Push to: Past consideration is generally not consideration. Moral obligation alone does not bind. The material-benefit exception (later R2d § 86) requires the benefit to flow to the promisor.

Hypothetical · 90 sec

Vary. Vary one fact. The son is a minor and the father has a legal duty of support. The stranger nurses the son. The father later promises to pay. Same result?

Point: The variation introduces an antecedent legal duty. The stranger has discharged the father's own obligation. The benefit now runs to the father. This is the doctrinal seam between Mills (no liability) and Webb v. McGowin (liability). One fact moves the case.

Integration · 60 sec

Q. You have felt the gap between what is morally required and what the law enforces. Where else does the law leave a moral claim unenforced because a doctrinal element is missing?

Land: Mills is the boundary case for moral obligation. Past consideration is no consideration. R2d § 86 is the narrow exception, and Mills sits on the unenforceable side. This is the chok / mishpat boundary in the consideration doctrine: the formal requirement (benefit to the promisor) refuses to bend to moral pull.

Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).