This chapter examines the narrow doctrine that can enforce a later promise made in recognition of a previously conferred benefit. The aftermath of Battle of Five Armies offers a natural lens for asking when gratitude, rescue, and moral obligation cross into legal obligation.
Doctrinal map
Past consideration is generally not enforceable — Mills v. Wyman — but R2d § 86 supplies an important exception: a promise to pay for a material benefit conferred, where the promisee did not act gratuitously, is enforceable to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Webb v. McGowin (life saved, subsequent promise of weekly support) is the canonical application. Drake v. Bell applies the modern version. The student leaves able to map the line between gratitude (no enforcement) and material benefit conferred (enforcement bounded by proportionality).
Key Sources
Key Rules
- R2d § 86: Promise for benefit previously received is binding to extent necessary to prevent injustice
- Material benefit rule: past consideration + subsequent promise
Cases
- Mills v. Wyman 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) A moral obligation alone is not sufficient consideration to support a promise. A promise to pay for benefits already conferred to a third person (here, an adult son) is unenforceable for want of consideration.
- Webb v. McGowin 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935) Where the promisee has materially benefited the promisor by an act done at risk to the promisee, a subsequent promise to pay for that benefit is enforceable; moral obligation can support such a promise when accompanied by a material benefit previously received.
- Drake v. Bell 26 Misc. 237, 55 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1899) Where a benefit has been conferred under circumstances showing an expectation of payment, and the recipient promises to pay after receiving the benefit, the promise is enforceable. Mistake in the identity of the benefited party does not defeat recovery when the actual recipient knowingly accepts and promises.