R2d § 42
Revocation by Communication from Offeror Received by Offeree
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract.
Professor's notes
Section 42 states the default rule for direct revocation: a communicated revocation is effective when the offeree receives it. Two elements follow immediately. First, the communication must be from the offeror (or through the offeror's agent); indirect notice through a reliable third party is handled in R2d § 43 but rests on the same principle. Second, receipt governs, not dispatch — the offeror cannot argue revocation was complete when she sent the message if the offeree had not yet received it.
The doctrinal move is to locate power in the offeror's hands while the offer remains open. An offer is not a contract; it creates only a power of acceptance. Section 42 closes that power. This sets up the chapter's core tension: the offeror can revoke at any point before acceptance, but once acceptance is dispatched under the mailbox rule (R2d § 63), revocation has no effect even if it arrives first.
Paradigm fact pattern: A mails an offer to B on Monday. A mails a revocation on Wednesday. B receives the offer on Tuesday and the revocation on Friday. B mails an acceptance on Thursday (before receiving the revocation on Friday). Under § 63, B's acceptance was effective Thursday; under § 42, A's revocation was not effective until Friday. A contract was formed. The timing sequence matters more than students expect.
Students often assume an offer can be revoked by the same method used to make it, or that the revocation is effective when sent. Press them on receipt. Ask: what if the revocation is communicated by a reliable but unauthorized third party — and compare § 43. Ask: what if A offers a reward publicly — can she revoke by the same public channel?
Connect to R2d § 43 (indirect communication of revocation), R2d § 36 (termination of power of acceptance generally), R2d § 63 (acceptance by mail effective on dispatch), and UCC § 2-205 (firm offers irrevocable without consideration). Chapter 5 cases — Smaligo v. Fireman's Fund and Yaros v. Trustees of U. Penn. — work through the boundary between valid revocation and acceptance in the context of unilateral and bilateral offer structures.
Section 42 supplies the basic rule: an offer can be revoked by communication to the offeree, effective on receipt. The rule has well-known exceptions: firm offers under UCC § 2-205, option contracts under § 87, offers becoming irrevocable through reliance under R2d § 87(2): but the default is that the offeror retains the power to revoke until the offeree accepts.