This chapter distinguishes promises, agreements, and bargains, then explains why contract law looks to manifested assent rather than private intention. The Burglar Agreement connection underscores how even dubious arrangements still turn on objective signals of commitment.
Doctrinal map
The doctrinal moves are these. A promise (R2d § 2) is a manifestation of intent to be bound. An agreement is a mutual manifestation. A bargain is an agreement supported by exchange. Not every promise becomes a contract, and not every contract is in writing. Pappas v. Bever draws the line between intent and promise; Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School shows how conduct can build a contract from acts rather than from a single document.
Key Sources
Key Rules
- R2d § 1: Contract = promise(s) for which law gives remedy
- R2d § 2(1): Promise = manifestation of intention to act
- R2d § 3: Agreement = mutual assent; Bargain = agreement to exchange
- Objective theory: meeting of the minds is outdated — overt acts control
Cases
- Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977) A contract may be formed through a sequence of acts when one party invites performance, the other performs, and the conduct objectively manifests assent; the offeror's undisclosed intent is immaterial.
- Pappas v. Bever 219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974) A statement of present intention to act in the future is not a promise; the language of intent does not become a binding commitment merely because the speaker later behaves as if it were.
Contrary to popular belief, contract law does not require a 'meeting of the minds.'