Hawkins v. McGee

84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1929

Rule

Damages for breach of a doctor's express warranty of a medical result are measured by the difference between the value of the hand as warranted (a perfect hand) and the value of the hand as it actually is, plus any incidental losses; not by the patient's pain and suffering.

Learning outcomes

By the end of working with this case, you can:

Supplemental case. Hawkins v. McGee is not in the assigned reading for Contract Law: Rules, Cases, and Problems (2d ed.). It appears in many first-year contracts courses as the “Hairy Hand” case and as a vehicle for introducing the expectation interest. Professor Oranburg uses it on Day 1 as a cold-call supplement, not as a doctrinal anchor. Students should read it for the flavor of legal analysis, not as exam material.

Facts

George Hawkins, an eighteen-year-old in New Hampshire, had a badly scarred right hand. Dr. Edward McGee, a surgeon, repeatedly approached the family offering to perform a skin-graft procedure that he said would restore the hand to perfection. He said variously that he would “guarantee to make the hand a hundred per cent perfect hand” and that Hawkins would “only have to be in the hospital three or four days.” The procedure was performed; the doctor grafted skin from Hawkins’s chest. The result was disfiguring: the grafted skin, taken from the chest, was thick and grew hair, and Hawkins’s hand was substantially worse than before. He sued the doctor for breach of an express warranty of a perfect hand.

Holding

The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that Hawkins could recover damages measured by the difference between the value of the hand as warranted (a perfect, hundred-percent hand) and the value of the hand as it actually was after the surgery. Damages for pain and suffering attributable to the surgery itself were not recoverable as breach-of-contract damages because the pain was an incident of performance, not of breach. Hawkins could also recover the incidental losses fairly traceable to the breach.

Reasoning

The court distinguished between tort and contract recovery. A surgeon does not warrant a result simply by performing surgery; he warrants only reasonable care. But where a surgeon expressly warrants a specific result, the warranty becomes contractual, and breach is measured the way other contract breaches are measured. The expectation interest puts the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the warranty been performed (the warranted “perfect” hand). Pain and suffering are not part of that difference; they were part of the bargained-for price of the procedure.

Why it matters

Hawkins is the most cited “first day of Contracts” case in American legal education. It introduces:

The case does not appear in the assigned reading for this course because the casebook’s Chapter 1 introduces these themes through different cases. Professor Oranburg uses Hawkins as a cold-call vehicle on Day 1 to introduce the expectation-interest framing that will return in Module VII, but the case is not on the exam and is not in the syllabus’s case map.

The trap

Tort framing. The student treats Hawkins as a medical-injury case (doctor harmed the hand, doctor pays for the harm) rather than a broken-promise case (doctor promised a perfect hand, doctor pays the gap between promised and delivered).

The operational intuition the case is designed to break. Naming the trap is what the Socratic exchange is for.

Socratic ladder

The professor's scaffold for the in-class exchange. Each rung is a stage; the questions are scripted prompts, not the punchline.

Surfacing · 90 sec

Q. A surgeon tells you, 'I will give you a one hundred percent perfect hand.' He operates. Your hand ends up worse than before the surgery, hairy, partly closed, useless for fine work. He hands you a bill. What should you get from him, and what is the measure?

Look for: The operational instinct. Hawkins was hurt by the surgery, so he should get what the surgery cost him, plus pain and suffering. Tort framing. The tort answer is the bait. Do not correct yet.

Holding · 60 sec

Q. What did the New Hampshire Supreme Court actually do with the trial-court verdict?

Look for: The appellate court reversed because the measure was wrong. The trial court used a pain-and-suffering measure; the appellate court said the measure is the gap between what was promised and what was delivered.

Reasoning · 120 sec

Q. If the right measure is not what the surgery cost Hawkins in pain, what is it? Quote the court's words.

Trap: Tort framing. The student is treating the case as personal injury. The doctor's scalpel did the damage, so the doctor pays the damage. The court is doing something different. The contract is a promise of a result: a perfect hand. The breach is the gap between the promised result and the delivered result. The measure runs from promise to delivery, anchored at delivery, not at the pre-surgery baseline.

Board: Damages = (value of hand as promised) − (value of hand as delivered)

Push back: The court tells us pain and suffering is not the measure. Why not? What did McGee promise: to operate carefully, or to deliver a perfect hand?

Push to: Expectancy. Value of the hand as warranted, minus value of the hand as delivered. R2d § 347 supplies the label; the student names the result and earns the label.

Hypothetical · 90 sec

Vary. Same surgeon, same promise, same patient. The surgery is a complete success. The hand is perfect. The hospital then bills Hawkins three times what the parties had agreed. Hawkins refuses to pay the overage. The hospital sues. What is the measure of the hospital's damages, and is anything left for Hawkins?

Point: Expectancy runs in both directions. The hospital was promised a fee; it gets the difference between the promised fee and what it was paid. The point of expectancy is to put the promisee where the promise would have put her. The patient and the provider both have access to the measure.

Integration · 60 sec

Q. This year asks two questions. Fall asks whether the parties made a contract. Spring asks what their contract means and what happens when one side falls short. Hawkins answers the spring question on Day 1. Why are we starting here?

Land: The year arc. A contract is a promise the law enforces by giving the promisee the value of the promise. The fall semester returns to whether such a promise was made and is enforceable; Module VII at the end of spring returns to Hawkins as the case that frames the whole apparatus. The student should hold this case for the rest of the year.

Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).