Statute of Frauds gate: year review
Foundations · Nov 30
Floor. ~40 min: Statute of Frauds (McIntosh) and mistake (Sherwood). The defenses with the cleanest element structure.
Target. ~75 min: Floor + improper bargaining (Quebodeaux) and incapacity (Webster Street). One case per defense chapter.
(1) The following classes of contracts are subject to a statute, commonly called the Statute of Frauds, forbidding enforcement unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception:
(a) a contract of an executor or administrator to answer for a duty of his decedent (the executor-administrator provision);
(b) a contract to answer for the duty of another (the suretyship provision);
(c) a contract made upon consideration of marriage (the marriage provision);
(d) a contract for the sale of an interest in land (the land contract provision);
(e) a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof (the one-year provision).
(2) The following classes of contracts, which were traditionally subject to the Statute of Frauds, are now governed by Statute of Frauds provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code:
(a) a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $ 500 or more (U.C.C. § 2-201);
...
(5) In many states other classes of contracts are subject to a requirement of a writing.
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154.
(2) In determining whether the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, account is taken of any relief by way of reformation, restitution, or otherwise.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.
52 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970)
Supreme Court of Hawai'i
Rule. Promissory estoppel can take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds where the promisee has reasonably and foreseeably relied to substantial detriment, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.
66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887)
Supreme Court of Michigan
Rule. A mutual mistake going to the substance of the thing bargained for, not merely to its quality, renders the contract voidable. Where both parties believed a cow to be barren and she proved fertile, the mistake went to the very nature of the bargained-for animal.
102 Ohio App. 3d 502, 657 N.E.2d 539 (1995)
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District
Rule. Duress rendering a contract voidable requires three elements: an involuntary act by the victim, no reasonable alternative to the act, and circumstances induced by the other party. Threats that exploit a power imbalance and leave no realistic option satisfy the test.
220 Neb. 9, 368 N.W.2d 439 (1985)
Supreme Court of Nebraska
Rule. A contract entered into by a minor is voidable. The minor may disaffirm within a reasonable time after reaching majority. Necessaries are an exception, but housing is not a necessary where the minor could live with parents able and willing to provide for him.
219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974)
Supreme Court of Iowa
Rule. A statement of present intention to act in the future is not a promise; absent manifestation toward a specific promisee committing the speaker to a specified act, the law finds no enforceable promise.
69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977)
Supreme Court of Illinois
Rule. Manifestation of mutual assent can be made by conduct; an invitation on stated criteria plus payment by the applicant manifests assent to those criteria. No fall defense defeats Steinberg on its facts.
196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954)
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Rule. Objective manifestation controls; subjective belief that the conduct was a joke is not a defense if a reasonable person in the other party's position would believe a serious bargain was made. The fall defenses do not rescue Zehmer on these facts.
2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864)
Court of Exchequer
Rule. Where two parties attach materially different meanings to a critical term and neither has reason to know of the other's meaning, no contract is formed. R2d § 20 runs on its own track and is not a defense to a formed contract; it is a no-formation rule.
Seventeen-year-old Maria signs a one-year apartment lease for $1,400/month. She is intoxicated when she signs. The lease was an oral agreement memorialized in a text message: "Apt 4B, $1,400/mo, sign tomorrow." Maria moves in. After two months, she wants out.
Q. Walk every defense. Which fits?
Mid-year stretch. Stack three defenses on one fact pattern. A 17-year-old (infancy) signs an exclusive-dealing contract with a supplier (good faith / R2d § 205). The supplier later discovers the buyer is also negotiating with a competitor (alleged duress to renegotiate). Which defense reaches first, and what does the stacking change?
Stretch problems from the chapter.
Mid-year synthesis II: defenses as override gates. Today's review: the Module IV defenses (SoF, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionability, incapacity) override formation in different ways: some void (physical compulsion), some voidable (the rest), some merely unenforceable (SoF). Class 27 opens Module V with ambiguity and interpretation.
Next class: Buffer / Catch-up Day
_Defenses_ · Nov 24
No new doctrine. Class 25 holds open time for any case from Modules I through IV the room wants to revisit, plus exam-format orientation. Bring one question you cannot answer cleanly from a fall case. The room sets the agenda. Come ready with that question. You may be called to ask it.